In this postscript I move from the interpretation of the *ergon* argument itself to the consequences of it for the final chapter of the *Eudemian Ethics*. The interpretation of the *Eudemian Ethics* VIII.3 will provide me a basis for a preliminary comparison with the *Nicomachean Ethics*. My subsequent interpretation of the *Nicomachean* version of the *ergon* argument will focus on different issues and most of my claims in this postscript are based on my interpretation of the *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemian Ethics* anyway, the comparison with the *Nicomachean Ethics* merely suggests how to understand some differences as well as similarities between the ethical treatises. Therefore, I think it is justified to discuss some aspects of the *Nicomachean Ethics* before the detailed analyses of the *ergon* argument, which will not be directly needed for my argument in this postscript.

Despite jumping over more than six books (including the common books), the concluding chapter of the *Eudemian Ethics* is a sort of natural continuation for the interpretation of the *ergon* argument in *EE* II.1.[[1]](#footnote-1) We saw above that the final definition of *eudaimonia* was that it is ‘the activity of a perfect living in accordance with perfect virtue’ (1219a38-39). The final passages of the *Eudemian Ethics* provide us with a clear definition and structure of the perfect virtue. The perfect virtue is *kalokagathia* (1249a16), it is a virtue that is composed by all the partial virtues discussed so far (1248b8-10).[[2]](#footnote-2) The *kalokagathia* is perfect in the sense of being complete and not missing any part; further, it is perfect, because, as we will see, it even adds something valuable to the natural goods like health, wealth or honour.

1. Cf. similarly Kenny (1992, 93–4). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The text allows the reading that *kalokagathia* is composed from the virtues which were discussed or at least mentioned in the *Eudemian Ethics*; depending on the strength we give to the claim ‘we have already spoken about each particular virtue’ (κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον) and the following expression that *kalokagathia* composed of these (διαρθρωτέον τῆς ἐκ τούτων), namely the virtues we have already spoken about (1248b8-10). One could argue that *kalokagathia* is a closed concept, a complete virtue composed exactly from these parts that were mentioned in *EE*. The other option would be to opt for a looser understanding, namely that *kalokagathia* is composed of all particular virtues regardless whether they were mentioned or not. Cf. discussion in Cooper (1975, 118) who argues that the complete virtue is made up of all the moral as well as intellectual virtues. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)